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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant
to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in that timely filing
of the Notice of Appeal was made on August 24, 1992 within

9 days

of the final Judgement of Contempt entered on July 23, 19r

ani

from the Order and Judgement Regarding Attorney's Fees en
August 12, 1992 in the Third Judicial District Court in

re
-d

on

or

Salt Lake County, State of Utah (See Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d
543-544 at 1. Contempt, and cases cited therein.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented by the appeal are whether or not:
1)

The trial court finding that mitigating circumstances,

potentially provoking the actions causing the contempt, were not
relevant to a contempt proceeding and ruling on that basis to exclude
such evidence was in error*

The standard of review is reversal of

error in accordance with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 22, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103, and Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, Appendix D - Uniform Misdemeanor Fine/Bail Schedule;
2)

Assistance of counsel for BULLOCK (the defendant/appellant)

during the court's hearing and review was ineffective and deficient
to the extent that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and, second, that such deficiency or ineffectiveness
prejudiced the defense so as to deprive BULLOCK of a fair trial.
The standard of review is the failure of counsel to satisfy the
requirements Sec, 78-51-26 Utah Judicial Code and Rules 1.1 and 1.3
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Part II, Chapter 13.
Issues also subordinate to counsel's assistance are:

2(a)

Attorney's fees awarded to TOYOTA, plaint iff/appellee,

(BULLOCK's counsel failing to present rebuttal reserved at trial)
lacked sufficient basis for court's finding of fact and judgement.
The Standard of review is sufficiency of basis for finding of fact
pursuant to Rule 201 Utah Rules of Evidence and Rule 4-505 Utah
Code of Judicial Administration.
2(b) The court had jurisdiction if BULLOCK was not served
adequate notice on Order to Show Cause.

The standard of review

is insufficiency of service on BULLOCK of the Order to Show Cause
pursuant to Rule 6(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Judicial Code Annotated:
1) 78-32-10.

Contempt - Action by Court.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorney's fees.
There is no provision for an additional penalty of
attorney's fees for contempt. Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882
2) 78-32-11.
3) 78-51-26.

Damages to party agrieved.
Duties of attorneys and counselors.

It is the duty of an attorney and counselor:
(1) to support the Constitution and the laws of the
United States and of this state;
(2) to maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers;
(3) to counsel or maintain no other action, proceeding
or defense than that which appears to him to be legal and
just, excepting the defense of a person charged with a

(4) to employ for the purposes of maintaining the causes
confided to him such means only as are consistent with
truth and never to seek to mislead the judges by any
artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(5) to maintain inviolate the confidences, and at every
peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his client;
(6) to abstain from all offensive personality, and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged;
(7)

not to encourage either the commencement or

continuance of an action or proceeding from any corrupt
motive or passion or interest;
(8) never to reject for any consideration personal to
himself the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed; and
(9) to comply with all duly approved rules and regulations
prescribed by the board of commissioners of the Utah State
Bar and to pay the fees provided by law.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
...

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation, 6 ALR 4th 16
Utah Code of Judicial Administration:
1)

Part II, Chapter 13, Rules of Professional Conduct;
Rule 1.1.

Competence.

A lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.
Rule 1.3

Diligence.

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.
- 3 -

2) Ri

*
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(1) Affidavits in support of an awaru ^* c*v^
fees must be filed with the court and set forth
specifically ,•» the number of h o u r s spen!
for
which a11ornej '" s fees are c 1 aimed » » •
(4) Judgement's 1 or attorney's 1 ees should
awarded except as they conform t o the pi ovi s* .
this rule .••
^, Appendix

Uniform Misdemeanoi

A;s

Fine/Ba"1

" "M-

<?~***H«i«

:

The enhancement or reductions to the basic fine should
reflect the severity of the offense, the extent of victim
injury or property damage loss, the risk which offender
proposes to society, the offender's criminal and personal
history, and related factors. (Specific aggravating and
mitigating circumstances are set forth below.)
Aggi a ¥ a I i ug

and

M i t i fed I i ip,

M i i i g Jin I ni iiinK <" i r o u r n s t a n r e s ,

(1)
O f f e n d e r ' s ti" iiujuiJ c o n d u c t n e i t h e r c a u s e d
iior t h r e a t e n e d s e r i o u s harm.
(2)
O f f e n d e r a c t e d under ,'I rong pr
linn.
IJ t ah K u I OH ill'

Cr i mi I I H I

I

:

judgement and commitment.

(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilt}
or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor
more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the
court, w i t h the concurrence of t h e defendant, otherwise
orders. Pending sentence, the court m a y commit the
defendant or m a y continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing the sentence the court shall afford
the defendant an opportunity to m a k e a statement in his
own behalf and to present any information in mitigation
of punishment, or to show any legal cause w h y sentence
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall
also be given an opportunity to present any information
material to the imposition of s e n t e n c e .
i I'ul vt, -if (j v i
I? ii I F '"

T\ p IP

I1,' j» " i P u i' I

other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of
the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days
before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such
an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application.
When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall
be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided
in rule 59(c) opposing affidavits may be served not later than
1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be
served at some other time.
Utah Rules of Evidence:
1) Rule 103.

Rulings on Evidence.

(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears
of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if
the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from
the context within which questions were asked.
2) Rule 201.

Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice
of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the
matter noticed. In the absense of prior notification, the
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Kinds of facts.
Bookkeeping methods.
It is common knowledge in Utah that in the early history of
irrigation corporations the books and records were not always
kept according to rules of bookkeeping, and that proceedings
of officers and directors were not always fully and correctly
recorded. Nash v. Alpine Irrigation Co., 58 Utah 84, 197 P 704
(1922).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature

The case is one of contempt where BULLOCK was found guilty
of violating a court order restraining him from telephoning the
employees of TOYOTA (his estranged spouse's employer), jailed
forthwith for three days, fined $500,00, and held liable for
fees of TOYOTA'S counsel in the amount of $2,445.50.
BULLOCK's counsel appealed to this Court then, during the
course of the appeal - as a result of being disbarred, withdrew
as counsel.
BULLOCK, acting pro se, determined that the basis for the
original appeal as filed by his counsel lacked merit but continues
the appeal claiming 1) he has been provided ineffective counsel at
at the trial court level, and 2) there is apparent commission of
reversible error at the trial court level.
B. Course of Proceedings
On February 6, 1992 the Plaintiff, Toyota of Ogden, a Utah
Corporation brought a verified complaint to the trial Court
alleging BULLOCK had engaged in a plan to injure and damage
employee relationships of TOYOTA through engaging in repetitive
harassing telephone calls to the officers, employees, and family
members at their place of work and residences.

TOYOTA sought a

temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendant from making
such calls, issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining BULLOCK
from making such calls, an award of compensatory damages proved at
trial, and an award of $50,000 in punitive damages.
A temporary restraining order and summons to answer complaint
were served on BULLOCK on February 7, 1992.

On February 12, 1992

BULLOCK answered the complaint that, in part, his actions had been
an exercise of proper marital care and concern for his estranged
spouse in a dangerous and life threatening situation conce ning use
of alcohol and illicit drugs on the work premises of TOYO^ , and
that TOYOTA's response to BULLOCK's written letter of Jar *ry 20,
1992 to plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, Tony Divin
proximate cause for BULLOCK's actions.

were

After coming beiore the

court on February 13, 1992, the granting of TOYOTA's motion for
preliminary injunction enjoining BULLOCK from contacting TOYOTA'S
employees was ordered on February 25, 1992.
On June 26, 1992 TOYOTA moved the trial court for an order
requiring BULLOCK to appear and show cause why BULLOCK should
not be held in contempt of court, and on June 29, 1992 an Order to
Show Cause was served upon BULLOCK requiring him to appear before
the court on July 6, 1992.
On July 2, 1992 BULLOCK retained Ray S. Stoddard as counsel
and provided to him a copy of the Order to Show Cause and a tape
recording of two messages left on BULLOCK's answering machine on
June 29, 1992.
At court on July 6, 1992, BULLOCK's counsel raised two
objections to the court's jurisdiction in the proceeding based on
the adequacy of notice with regard to the time allowed to respond
and documents accompanying the Order to Show Cause.

BULLOCK's

counsel requested a two week continuation in that he, because of
the July 4th holiday, had not even had the court open a full day
so as to allow his review of court records.

TOYOTA's counsel

noted "I don't believe that there is anything in the rules that
- 7 -

requires anything to be supported by the Order to Show Cause and
be served upon the opposing party.

There is nothing in the rules

specifically." (See July 6 transcript, pg3/21-25).
The court granted a continuation to the following day, July 7,
1992, and noted that the original Order to Show Cause "doesn't have
an affidavit with it."

(See July 6 transcript, pglO/3-4).

At court on July 7, 1992, BULLOCK's counsel renewed his motion
that the court lacked jurisdiction and noted he had not "actually
seen the (court's) file."

(See July 7 transcript, pg4/8-9).

TOYOTA's counsel presented the court a Notice of Continuance
delivered to BULLOCK's counsel the night before maintaining it
"essentially contains all of the pleadings and all of the documents
in the court's file."

(See July 7 transcript, pgl/19-22). TOYOTA's

counsel noted he had to "correct myself in indicating to the Court
that I was not aware of a rule requiring service of an affidavit
withan Order to Show Cause.

Rule 6 clearly requires that certain

Orders to Show Cause be accompanied by an affidavit." (See July 7
transcript pg2/l-6).
The Notice of Continuance delivered the night before to
BULLOCK's counsel contained a Constable's Return of Service showing
service on June 29, 1992 of only an ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.

TOYOTA's

counsel then presented to the court an original Constable's Amended
Return of Service showing service on June 29, 1992 of an ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT & MEMORANDUM.

BULLOCK's counsel

did not challenge the presentation of the Amended Return of Service
even when the court queried, "Why is there an Amended Constable's
Return."

(See July 7 transcript pg3/7-8).

TOYOTA'S counsel presented to the court an affidavit as a
proffer to what attorney's fees would be if awarded by the court.
BULLOCK's counsel reserved the right to reopen and challenge the
affidavit and proffer after noting that he did not think TOYOTA
was entitled to attorney's fees.
"As to attorney's fees.

Later BULLOCK's counsel noted

I do have a lack of preparation time.

I

can cite in the annotations to 78-32-10, under attorney fees it
says, 'There is no provisions for additional penalty of attorney's
fees for a contempt.'

Miller vs. Coke (sic), 597 Pac2d 882.

not have time to read that case.

I did

I would like, before the Court

decides on the attorney's fees, I would like an opportunity to
read that ."

(See July 7 transcript pg39/23-25, pg40/l-5).

BULLOCK's counsel attempted to show that there were mitigating
circumstances in that employees of TOYOTA had harrassed, provoked,
and goated BULLOCK into violation of the Restraining Order noting
BULLOCK "did himself record two messages that ... indicate what the
kind of abuse he has been subjected to and I will ask at this point
does the Court want to hear testimony in mitigation of what has
happened and what he has been subjected to?

I think it is relevant

at this point" to which the court responded, "In all due respect,
Mr. Stoddard, I don't think mitigating circumstances are relevant to
this kind of proceeding.

There is a Court Order in place and the

only issues are whether he knew of the Court Order, whether he had
the ability to comply with it, whether he reasonably and knowingly
failed to or refused to comply with it.

And those are the relevant

issues and I don't think mitigation is relevant."
transcript pg37/16-25, pg38/l-20).

- 9 -

(See July 7

C.

Disposition by Third District Court

The court found that there had veen a violation of the Court
Order in the case and, at the trial on July 7, 1991, imposed a
fine of $50.00 for each of the 10 phone calls made on June 27,
1992, ordered BULLOCK to serve 3 days in jail commitment

issuing

forthwith, awarded costs to be paid by BULLOCK to TOYOTA, and
took under advisement with regard to awarding attorney's fees.
In a July 23, 1992 Memorandum Decision the court imposed a
fine of $50.00 per phone call for each of the 10 phone calls made
June 27, 1992, a jail sentence of five days, and awarded costs
and attorney's fees totaling $2,445.50 to be paid by BULLOCK to
TOYOTA

within 20 days of the date of the ruling.

BULLOCK's counsel made no subsequent attempt, after trial,
to challenge or offer contrary evidencce to the amount of awarded
attorney's fees as had been his stated and reserved intent at
trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Issue 1:
The contempt charge was a criminal procedure, and, pursuant
to Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Appendix D, UCJA,
the trial judge may have erred in ruling that BULLOCK's testimony
and offered evidence were irrelevant and inadmissable regarding the
mitigating circumstances surrounding the contemnor's actions.
Isuue 2:
Rules 1.1 and 1.3, Part II, Chapter 13, UCJR and 78-51-26 UJC
require counsel to maintain the competence, including thoroughness
and preparation, and diligence to adequately represent a client.
The failure of BULLOCK's counsel to 1) review the court files

prior to trial, 2) review case laws critical to the defense,
3) challenge TOYOTA's counsel's presentation of clearly suspect
evidence (or move to have same stricken), and, 4) fail to offer
rebuttal (after reserving the intent to do so during trial) >f
the reasonableness of attorney's fees as submitted by TOYOT

has

clearly left BULLOCK with an inadequate representation pre

dcial

to the court's review, findings, and judgements in the ca ,.
Issue 2(a):
BULLOCK's counsel reserved at trial his intent to review and
respond to, first, the court's authority for awarding and, second,
the reasonableness of the submitted attorney's fees.

Through an

apparent lack of diligence BULLOCK's counsel failed to make a
timely response to either the court's authority for awarding or
the reasonablness of noted fees, except to use the issue of the
court's authority to award as basis for the appeal at Bar.
It is the contention of BULLOCK - serving now pro se as his
own counsel after withdrawl of Ray Stoddard as counsel - that:
1) authority to award attorney's fees is justified by law and
and precedent in this action and that prior counsel's filing of
this appeal on that basis lacked merit;
2) court's finding that TOYOTA'S attorney's fees were reasonable,
without contrary evidence presented, was exercise of adjudicative
notice pursuant to rule 201 URE and finding lacked basis, prima
facie, in that the affidavit TOYOTA's counsel submitted was not
pursuant to Rule 4-505 Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Issue 2(b):
BULLOCK's counselor failed to object to or move to strike
court's admission of an Amended Return of Service which cleared
for the court a jurisdictional question that had been raised.
- 11 -

at that time BULLOCK*s counselor had available an original
Return of Service contradicting the admitted one and giving
support to the premise that the court lacked jurisdiction.
Because BULLOCK's counselor had been denied a continuance for a
reasonable amount of time to prepare for the case, this failure was
critical in that an evidentiary hearing to determine what had in fact
been served on the defendant would have allowed the time necessary for
adequate preparation of the case.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT

Issue 1:
Though the matter before the court is a civil proceeding,
the contempt charge was a criminal procedure in that it resulted
in a penalty for contempt that included commitment

to jail and

fine, "solely and simply to vindicate the authority of the court
or to punish otherwise for conduct offensive to the public in
violation of an order of the court.

Thus, where the object of a

contempt proceeding is to vindicate the dignity or authority of
the court, it is criminal in character even though it arises
from, or is ancillary to a civil action ... when the defendant
is incarcerated for a definite period of time for having failed
to obey a court order, the contempt is criminal.

Similarly, when

the contemnor is required to pay a fine for having disobeyed a
a court order, the contempt is criminal."

(See Am Jur 2d, 374).

In Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 at [5] "Contempt order
is 'criminal' if fine or sentence is fixed and unconditional,
but is 'civil1 if fine or imprisonment is conditional such that

contemnor can obtain relief from contempt order merely by doing
some act as ordered by the court."
The trial judge attested to her belief that the procedure
was civil contempt as can be seen from the transcript of the
proceedings on July 6, 1992 at page 6, lines 1-5.
Whether civil or criminal the court should follow some rules
of procedure even given the latitude judges have in matters
contempt of court.
In State v. Lush, 95 N.W.2d 695, at [41 "Contempt being
without any particular form of action, is not subject to the
limitations of procedure prescribed for the conduct of either civil
or criminal actions.

See State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, supra.

However, we have often said that a prosecution for criminal contempt
is governed by, and to be conducted in accordance with, the strict
rules applicable in criminal prosecutions."
Presuming that the Utah Criminal Rules of Procedure ought to
be followed in criminal contempt hearings, then the exclusion of
testimony and evidence as not relevant before sentencing, when
purporting to demonstrate mitigating circumstances, is reversible
error in accordance with Rule 103(a)(2) of the U.R.E.
In Osmus v. Osmus, 198 P.2d 233, 235 (the only referrence found
in a computer word search of Utah cases using "contempt, mitigation,
and punishment") Justice Wolfe comments at [2,3], "The fact that
plaintiff received $5,000 for the equity in the home did not excuse
the defendant from complying with the order of the court.

The

existence of independent means might be a factor to be considered
by the court in fixing alimony, or in considering a petition for
modification of a decree, or perhaps, under certain circumstances,
- 13 -

in initiation for punishment of contempt."
In Utah the issue begs determination.
however, there does exist precedent.
173 P.2d 173, at 3. "Divorce

(Emphasis added)
Across the nation,

In Trowbridge v. Trowbridge,

In contempt proceeding ancillary

to divorce action, court erred in imposing jail sentence on
husband, for violating order barring him from his home pending
divorce action, without permitting husband to introduce evidence
that before he attempted to force his way into his house he saw
his wife and another man under circumstances which would have
tended to excuse his violation of order, or would at least have
tended to mitigate the offense."

In Justice Robinson's opinion,

Supreme Court of Washington, "We think that appellant was entitled
at the very least, to submit the offered evidence to the effect
that he saw through a window a man, partially disrobed, on a bed
with his wife, before he attempted to force his way into the house
in violation of the injunctive order.

An outright killing, under

such circumstances is frequently held to be justifiable homicide,
or perhaps more often, merely manslaughter.

Surely, such evidence

would have tended to excuse the violation of a routine order
barring him from his home, or would have at least tended to
mitigate the offense, if any.

Of course, the offered evidence

may be wholly fictitious, but it was material.
The judgement and sentence appealed from is reversed, and the
cause remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and
appropriate.
BEALS, C. J., and MILLARD, and JEFFERS, JJ., concur."
Though BULLOCK's counsel appears, perhaps, ineffective in his
representation at the

many points noted herein, at least in his

attempt to have the court admit testimony and evidence pertaining
to mitigating circumstances relevant to BULLOCK's sentencing he
was persistent. (See July 7 transcript pgl9/20-25, pg20/20-25.
pg27/10-25, pg37/16-25, pg38/2-38, & pg39/l-ll).

On the basi

relevancy to a civil contempt hearing the court excluded ter
and offered evidence.

(See July 7 transcript at same refer

of
mony

ices).

Issue 2:
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 at
[5] Criminal Law.,

"A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's

assistance was so defective as to require reversal ... has two
components: first, defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient, requiring showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed by the Sixth Ammendment and, Second, defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense by
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
BULLOCK's counsel, during trial, mentioned or demonstrated
on several occassions he was not prepared (had not had the time
to prepare) for hearing of the case. (See

July 6 transcript at

pg2/20-25, pg3/l-4&18-19, Pg5/22-25 and on July 7 at pg21/8-ll*,
pg39/23-25, pg40/9-10*).

He reserved on two of those occasions

(noted as * above) that he wished to reserve for later comment the
appropriateness as to the award of and amount of the attorney's
fees TOYOTA sought to recover.

At no time did BULLOCK's counsel

communicate with BULLOCK, either in written or oral fashion, as
to what was transpiring in this case regarding those fees. From
the day the notice of appeal was filed (August 24, 1992) until
- 15 -

some five month's after counsel's withdrawl of representation
(April 9, 1993), only once did counsel communicate with BULLOCK
and that was to request $200 for preparation of a brief (in March
of 1993).

Counsel's failure to respond to TOYOTA's counsel's

communications, the memorandum decision of the trial court, or to
keep BULLOCK informed demonstrates an ineffectiveness, if not a
total disregard, of representation. [See issue (2a) herein]
In State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 at [3] "... We conclude
that the failure of defendant's trial counsel to object to the
prosecutor's comment to the jury regarding Stewart's invocation of
her testimonial deprived defendant of effective assistance of
counsel.

The two-part test adopted by the United States Supreme

Court in Strickland v. Washington ... and employed in this court
in our cases, 805 P.2d 182 ... has been met.

No sound course of

trial strategy could dictate defense counsel to be silent at such
a crucial time."
BULLOCK's counsel, in an attempt to secure a period of time
during which a strategy for the defense could be developed, made
several references to the court's lack of jurisdiction due to an
insufficiency of service (See July 6 transcript at pgl,2,3,5,6,7,^8
and July 7 transcript at pgl,2,3,&4) in that BULLOCK had not been
served an adequate Order to Show Cause with accompanting n affidavit.
When TOYOTA's counsel presented an Amended Return of Service
as proof of adequate service, even though BULLOCK's counsel had
at his disposal a copy of the original Return of service that
countered the presentation (see both returns in the Addendum),
counsel did not object.

When the judge asked TOYOTA's counsel

whv is there an Amended Constable's Return?", and TOYOTA's counsel

evaded admitting that the original supported BULLOCK's contention
that an affidavit had not accompanied the service (see July 7
transcript at pg3/7-13).

BULLOCK's counsel did not move to strike.

In order to secure the time to develop a strategy f
defense this was a critical juncture.

th

[See issue 2(b) ? jrei r |«

In Garrett v. Osborn (See 431 p.2d 1012) where ju igeir

t was

reversed and case remanded at 1. New Trial, "Attorney who at no
time during trial, pretrial conference, or other hearings offered
any argument or discussion explaining issues, and who neither
filed required briefs nor adequately explained his failure to file
briefs, and client was entitled to new trial.
2. Evidence

In determining whether litigant was entitled to

new trial on ground of inadequate counsel representation, court
could take judicial notice of fact that for reasons other than
conduct involved in present case, litigant's trial attorney had
been disbarred."
3.

(Emphasis added)

New Trial

Incompetence or neglect of counsel, under

some circumstances, will entitle litigant to a new trial."
(See also Jennings v. Stoker, Utah, 652 P.2d 912, and Malby v.
Cox Construction Co., Utah, 598 P.2d 336 (1979) in Chief Justice
Crockett's opinion which is concurred in by two other justices).
Issue 2(a):
BULLOCK's counsel reserved at trial (See July 7 transcript
pg20/17-25, pg21/l-14, pg39/23-25, and pg40/l-18) his intent to
review and respond to both the court's authority to award and, then
as well, the reasonableness of TOYOTA's attorney's fees.

Through

an apparent lack of diligence BULLOCK's counsel did neither.
In the court's July 23, 1993 memorandum decision the court

uses, cited by TOYOTA, Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528,(1981),
and also, as additional basis for the finding, the cases of B&R
Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 503 P2.d 1216 (Utah 1972) and Davidson
v. Munsey, 80 P. 743 (1905) to find the award of attorney's fees
under the "costs and expenses" provision of Section 78-32-11 and
supplemental affidavit submitted by TOYOTA'S counsel pursuant to
Rule 4-505 UCJA as reasonable and appropriate.
The court cites, contra, Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882, (1979).
In Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, Justice Oaks' opinion,
with concurrence of three other justices, finds at [8] "Appellant
challenges the propriety of the trial court's award of attorney's
fees for work after the 1973 judgement, including the appeal to
this Court and the contempt and other proceedings to enforce
appellant's contractual obligations and the orders of the court.
We find no error in this award.

The court's award of attorney's

fees ... was justified under the original contract provisions
obligating appellant to pay ... including counsel fees, or under
the 'costs and expenses' provision of 78-31-11".
Justice Oaks cites the two other above noted cases that, in
this case, trial court Judge Anne M. Stirba cites as suppportive
to her findings.
In B & R Supply v. Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216, Justice Crockett,
with the concurrence of the three other juutices, notes at [1] "It is
well established in our law that attorney's fees cannot be recovered
unless provided for by statute or by law."

The remainder of the

opinion address whether by contract such attorney's fees should be
awarded and determines that some, invoices signed by Leo Bringhurst,
were allowable and some, those signed by his agent, were not.

The

court's use as basis in this case to support it's finding appears
immaterial in that the case addresses neither contempt nor
provisions of Section 78-32-11.
In Davidson v. Munsey, 80 P. 743, in an appeal of a decree
finding defendant guilty of contempt, at page 744 (paragraph t >)
Justice McCarty, with concurrence of two other justices, not^
"The next question raised by this appeal is, did the court err in
requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff $300 as attorney's
fees as a part of the costs and expenses incurred by him in the
prosecution of the action? ... It would seem that the Legislature,
by making use of the word 'expenses', and associating it with that
of 'costs', intended that something more than the usual or ordinary
costs that are allowed to a prevailing party in civil actions
generally might be allowed ... in addition to or in lieu of a fine
or imprisonment

... we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the

court proceeded entirely within the statute in allowing plaintiff
reasonable attorney's fees."
In Mellor v. Cook, 597 P2.d 882, the case cited by defendant's
counselor at trial (See July 7 transcript pg39/23-25 and pg40/l-5)
at [7] "Our conclusion as stated herein renders it unnecessary to
consider the matter of penalties imposed ... it seems not amiss
to observe that the penalty for contempt is set out in Sec. 78-32-10
... but we are aware of no provision authorizing an additional
penalty of attorney's fees."

The award of damages to an aggrieved

party in a contempt proceeding is covered by Sec. 78-32-11 and that
as appearing in Pacific Reporter, 2d Series "to pay plaintiff's
attorney" his feeis the note, Justice Crockett's observation, amiss
or not, is curious.

Be that as it may, the notation of this case in

the Utah Judicial Code Annotated for Sec* 78-32-10 was apparently
enough to confuse BULLOCK's counsel as to the appropriateness of
awarding attorney1s fees in this matter.
From the July 7, 1992 trial until the August 24, 1993 Notice of
Filing on this appeal, BULLOCK1s counsel apparently was not yet
well enough aware with this issue to realize it was not basis for
an appeal.

BULLOCK, now acting pro se as his own counsel, requests

requests this Court to take judicial notice of this in determining
the effectiveness and diligence of BULLOCK's counsel at the trial
court level.
Authority to award TOYOTA attorney's fees appears appropriate,
however the court's basis for finding these fees as "reasonable"
remains an issue in this appeal.
The court's finding in memorandum decision of "reasonable"
fees (without contrary evidence presented) was done under the
auspices of adjudicative notice governed by Rule 201 URE, in that
a court is recognized, by practice and precedent, to acknowledge
that which is "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court." Rule 201 URE(b)(l).

However, this adjudicative

finding requires of the court more than simple acquiescence to the
hourly rates charged by an attorney submitting his or her fee for
approval.

An attorney's fee is the extension of the hourly rate

multiplied by the hours of burden.

The trial court must therefore

take both rate and burden into its consideration for a finding that
fees are reasonable.
In the current case, because the court based its finding on
the affidavit submitted by TOYOTA's attorney pursuant to Rule 4-505
4-505 UCJA, there appears to be, prima facie, reversible error.

In this matter appearance of error occurs in both TOYOTA1s
attorney's compliance with Rule 4-505 UCJA and the finding of the
court as to the "reasonableness" of the attorney's fees using the
submitted affidavit as basis because:
(a)

The July 7, 1993 affidav-it submitted by Mr. Haslr

is

not in compliance with Rule 4-505(1) UCJA, making no disci

,u e of

his own hourly rate for six hours of burden claimed in tl -

tal.

(The appellant apologizes to this Court if the "supplemental"
affidavit referred to in the memorandum decision corrects this
technical deficiency.

At the time of the preparation of this

brief that supplement was not available in the files of prior
counsel and court records were not then accessible.

This also

means the additional $377.50 in attorney's fees awarded TOYOTA
for services performed after July 7, 1993 have not been reviewed
and are excluded from the following analysis.); and,
(b)

The submitted attorney's fees are an extension of hourly

rate multiplied by the burden in hours.

In the affidavit (prior

to the June 27, 1993 drunken spree in which BULLOCK talked to
himself on Mr. Tony Divino's mobile phone's answering machine
on ten separate occasions for a duration of a minute or less each)
a total burden of 6.1 hours was spent by Mr. Has lam and Mr. Holt
preparing the material supporting court issuance of a show cause
order, upon which the court so did.

A total of 5.1 hours was then

subsequently spent, as a result of the above noted drunken spree,
with both Mr. Has lam and Mr. Holt reviewing the tape recorded
messages left by BULLOCK, conversations with an officer named
Jerry Mendez (who likely has no show cause expertise), review
of Criminal Code, a telephone conference with an indemnification
- 21 -

bureau, and all manner of extraneous activity overburdening
a "reasonable" effort for a routine show cause hearing.

As well,

Mr. Has lam and Mr. Holt spent four hours on July 7th preparing for
the July 7, 1993 Show Cause hearing over and above the five hours
they had spent on July 6, 1993 in preparation for the very same but
abbreviated July 6, 1993 Show Cause hearing.

The burden claimed

is indeed "burdensome" for the preparation of a routine Show Cause
Order and accompanying motion and affidavit.
Lacking disclosure of Mr. HaslanTs hourly rate in the affidavit
submitted by him pursuant to Rule 4-505 UCJA and by apparently not
taking burden into its consideration, the court apparently erred
lacking basis for its finding of "reasonable" attorney's fees.
Issue 2(b):
BULLOCK'S counsel at both the July 6 and July 7, 1993 show
cause hearings, as is evident from the transcripts, made several
attempts to demonstrate that the court lacked jurisdiction due to
the insufficiency of service on the defendant (in that an affidavit
did not accompany the June 26, 1993 Order to Show Cause).

However,

at the July 7, 1993 hearing BULLOCK's counsel critically failed to
adequately represent defendant when TOYOTAfs council presented to
the court an Amended Return of Service.

BULLOCK's counsel had at

his disposal, though BULLOCK had not yet reviewed the material, a
Notice of Continuance delivered to him the night before by TOYOTA's
attorney purported to contain "all of the pleadings and all of the
documents in the Court's file."
pgl/21-22).

(See the July 7 transcript at

Contained therein was the original Return of Service

showing only a Show Cause Order being served.

The Amended Return

of Service showed that a Show Cause Order, Motion, and Affidavit

*.* ,uC piutccuing xo allow development of a strategy for the
defense, research of points in law, taking of depositions, etc.;
but BULLOCK's counselor made no objectionto the document's admission.
After the court admitted the document and queried of TOYOTA
why there was an Amended Constables Return, TOYOTA's counselo ,
Mr. Haslam, evaded the fact that the Original Return of Sersupport to BULLOCK's claim of insufficiency of service and
of jurisdiction for the court.
to strike.

e gave
problem

BULLOCK's counselor made . > motion

BULLOCK lost the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing

which would have allowed gaining the time to develop a strategy to
achieve the legal outcome at the trial court level for those issues
that are on appeal presently at Bar.

Namely, allowance of testimony

regarding mitigating circumstances and challenge of reasonableness
of attorney's fees, as well as possibly avoiding three days in jail.
In Robinson v. City Court for City of Ogden, 185 P.2d 256, [7J
"The affidavit takes the place of the complaint, and whether the
contempt be regarded as civil or criminal, when not committed in the
presence of the court or the judge in his chambers, the court is
without jurisdiction to proceed until a pleading of some nature has
been served on the accused and filed with the court." (Emphasis added)
In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P2.d 288 at [5,6] " ... There being
no effective service of process, the court was without jurisdiction
to enter the original decree of divorce ... Rule 60(b) provides in
pertinent part as follows ... (4) when, for any cause, the summons
in an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) ... (5) the judgement is void; ... Even under
subsection (5) a void judgement seemingly must be challenged within
- 23 -

a "reasonable time."

But where the judgement is void because of a

fatally defective service of process, the time limitations ... have
no application.

...

the order denying relief from judgement must

be, and is, reversed.

The case is remanded for entry of judgement

vacating the decree of divorce because of the ineffective service of
process."
In Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 at [2.3] "Service of process
here was defective, not only because of the false return but because
it required answer in 20 days instead of 30 days.
jurisdictional.

...

Such service is

The case is remanded with instruction to vacate

the judgement and let the parties take it from there."
CONCLUSION
With respect to each issue individually:
1)

The trial court's disallowance, on basis of irrelevancy,

of potentially pertinent testimony and evidence addressing
mitigation of contemnor's sentence appears to be reversible
error.
At minimum, vacating of judgement is required with remand
to lower court.
2)

The inadequacy of BULLOCK's counsel's performance both

generally and as to particular points of apparent reversible
error that adversely affected the outcome of the trial though the proximate cause of such inadequacy may have been
the trial court's disallowance of counselor's request for
appropriate time to review court files and otherwise prepare
for trial (notwithstanding the counselor's later performance
and subsequent withdrawl for reason of disbarment in the case

at Bar) - denied BULLOCK his right to a fair trial as is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution entitling defendant to a trial de novo with
remand to trial court.
2(a)

Deficiencies in the affidavit supporting attorney's

fees are apparent, particularly with regard to undisclosed
hourly rate and detail of burden pursuant to Rule 4-505 U C * \ .
Court's finding of reasonable attorney's fees lacks basis,
requiring vacating of judgement and remand to court.
2(b)

This court may, from the court record and the two

conflicting Returns of Service (see addendum), decide to
to remand to court to determine, in evidentiary hearing,
which of the documents represents the truth.

The papers

speak for themselves.

spectfully submitted this

day of November, 1993.

/LfAJU
John R. Bullock, Pro se
Defendant/Appellant
5075 West 4700 South #59
Kearns, Utah
84118

ADDENDUM

1) June 29, 1992 Returns of Service
a - Original
b - Amended
2) Transcripts of trial testimony

CONSTABLE'S RETUHN
I, J&H PHELPS

/ being first drily sworn on oath and say:

I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service
herein, and not a part of or interested in the within action*
I received the within and hereto annexed,
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
on the 26 of JUN

, 1992 , and served the same upon BULLOCX, JOHN R*
(

a within named defendant in said,

(
(

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
by serving a true copy of said,
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
for the defendant with JOHH R. BULLOCK (PERSOHALLZ)
a person of suitable age and discretion there residing at,
5075 WEST 4700 SOUTH #59

,SALT LAKE CITY

his/her usual place of ABODE

, on this 29 day of JON

,19

I further ceritfy that at the time of service of the said,
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
I endorsed the date and place of service and axided my name and official
title thereto•
On the 29 day of JUN

Deputy Ln.

, 1992

°T Pkdpb-

SL 803

Robert^Reitz Constable, Salt Lake County
396 Cypress St«, Midvale at, 84047 580-1:
Fees

Service Fee
Mileage
2nd Address
Postage/Filing
Copies
Extra Cost

$6-00
315-00

Total

$21-00

CONSTABLE'S RETURN
I, JAN PHELPS

, being first duly sworn on oath and say:

I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service
srein, and not a part of or interested in the within action.
I received the within and hereto annexed,
IDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT
MEMORANDUM
a the 26 of JUN

, 1992 , and served the same upon BULLOCK, JOHN R.

within named defendant in said,
RDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT
MEMORANDUM
y serving a true copy of said,
RDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT
: MEMORANDUM
:or the defendant with JOHN R. BULLOCK (PERSONALLY)
i person of suitable age and discretion there residing at,
5075 WEST 4700 SOUTH #59

,SALT LAKE CITY

lis/her usual place of ABODE

, on this 29 day of JUN

,1992

I further ceritfy that at the time of service of the said,
3RDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT
& MEMORANDUM
I endorsed the date and place of service and added my name and official
title thereto.
On the 29, day of JUN

Deputy/**

, 1992

'rPUf*-

SL 803

Robert Reitz Constable, Salt Lake County
396 Cypress St., Midvale Ut, 84047 580-174
tes

Service Fee
Mileage
2nd Address
Postage/Piling
Copies
Extra Cost

$6.00
$15.00

Total

$21.00
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MONDAY. JULY 6. 1992

3:00 P.M,

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: All right, let's go on the record
in the matter of Toyota of Ogden vs. John R. Bullock,
920900693-

Counsel, state your appearances, please.
MR- HASLAM:

Dennis Haslam appearing for the

plaintiff, Your Honor.
MR. STODDARD:

Ray Stoddard appearing for the

defendant.
THE COURT: All right, thank you, counsel. The
matter comes before the Court pursuant to the plaintiff's
Order to Show Cause why the defendant should not be held
in contempt of court. Counsel, you may proceed.
MR. STODDARD:

Your Honor, first I want to

raise two objections to this proceeding.

First, the

defendant has not received adequate notice under the
statute.
notice.

He was served last Monday, which is a four-day
Rule 16 requires five days' notice. More

serious, I think, is the fact he has not been served with
a copy of the affidavit. We don't know what he is
defending against.
The Utah case law is very clear.

I am citing

here the Robertson vs. The City of Ogden, 185 P2d 256.
Very clear that this Court has no jurisdiction until he
is served with a copy of the affidavit supporting the
1

Order to Show Cause.

I'm quoting from this case:

"The

affidavit takes the place of the complaint, whether the
complaint can be regarded as civil or criminal, were not
committed in the presence of the Court or the Judge in
his chambers, the Court is without jurisdiction to
proceed until a pleading of some nature has been served
upon the accused and filed with the court."
THE COURT: The pleading of some nature?
MR. STODDARD:

They are talking about in this

paragraph, about the affidavit. We need to show what he
is defending against.
The Rules of 78-32-sub 1 requires that it be
supported by affidavit.
purpose.

Of course, I think there is a

The purpose is that the defendant be served so

he knows what he defending against.
of that information.

It's in the nature

Right now, we are proceeding as if

the defendant were served with an information saying,
"You are charged with a crime, come and defend yourself."
We need to have something more.
I would also ask the Court to —
some problems preparing for this matter.

we also had
I was dust

retained Thursday.

I didn't realize it was a court

holiday on Friday.

We have some problems with the

preparation.

What we are simply asking for is a

continuance.

The defendant will be out of town all next
2

week, going back to the Democratic National Convention.
We will accept service today.

We are not trying to

obstruct. We are simply trying to get in a position
where we know what is going on.

THE COURT: Mr. Stoddard, with regard to the
two issues you have raised, notice and affidavit, at this
point I would ask Mr. Haslam to respond to those issues.
I think you are getting beyond, you know, those two
issues in your comments now.
MR. STODDARD:

I agree I am.

I am just saying

we are not trying to obstruct we just want to get this in
an orderly fashion.
THE COURT: All right, thank you.
MR. HASLAM:

Your Honor, I don't believe that

there is anything in the rules that requires anything to
be supported by the Order to Show Cause and be served
upon the opposing party.
specifically.

There is nothing in the rules

It is an order from the court to require
3

1

the party to appear.

2

Mr. Bullock was served on the 29th of June. He

3

has had from that day until this day to call my office

4

and ask for a copy.

5

a copy.

6

secretary about whether or not we were trying to serve

7
8
9

I

him.

He didn't call my office and ask for

He called my office, though, and spoke to my

So he had notice of this procedure last Monday.

THE COURT: Mr. Stoddard, where in the rule do
you contend you are entitled to receive an affidavit at
the time you received this Order to Show Cause?
MR. STODDARD:
Rule 38-3, 2, 9 or 8.
of me.

I think I left the one copy.
I don't have that right in front

It requires it be supported by a —

for Contempt be supported by affidavit.

the Motion

I don"t think it
5

1

actually requires that it be served, but I think Utah

2

case law does.

3

nature of a criminal proceeding.

4

I think it makes sense. This is in the

THE COURT:

No, it is not.

5

are talking about civil contempt.

6

MR. STODDARD:

Yeah.

Civil contempt. We

The Utah Supreme Court

7

vs. a quasi criminal proceeding.

The case I am citing, I

8

would like to present the Court.

I only have one copy of

9

it.

It is yellow, and again I read the Court that

10

phrasing and it does indicate that the Court has no

11

jurisdiction to proceed in this matter until the

12

defendant is served with a copy of the affidavit.

13

THE COURT: Where does it say that?

14

MR. STODDARD:

It says, "The affidavit takes

15

the place of a complaint and whether the contempt be

16

regarded as civil or criminal, but not committed in the

17

presence of the Court or the Judge in his chambers, the

18

Court is without jurisdiction to proceed until a pleading

19

of some nature has been served upon the accused and filed

20

in the court."

21

refers back to what that sentence is talking about which

22

is the affidavit.

23

There is one sentence.

THE COURT:

Now 78-32-4 says:

I think that

M

When the

24

contempt is not committed in the immediate view and

25

presence of the Court or Judge, a Warrant of Attachment

without a r-.. .

Person i„ charged <-„

» Prev l o u s
—

« * notice

«ed to

arrest

^ J J

or u p M

—

ffiseP|

« C0ffimitment,

«*»*-. « d no W a r r a n t o f ° r d e r t o < * ~ Cause D e
Co
without previo,
»»>itment oan be <„
SUed
Prev l o u s attachment t„
other order to S h o w C a u s e ..
T
*-h notice or
78

-32-3 says

n0t C O

™ l t t e d ^ the i m m e d i a t e • . " h M

*"* « * P

ln

-—
efereeing the
— t e d

VleW

in cheers

a

—

" " ^

thlnk

ls

of the

* • » *°

- —- or .dicrr

• « - sense.

-ntempt

the facts

y*:r

to the Court an, '

-

the

^onaliy,

of faots
r

^

THB

^

COURT- Th.»
to be „.
doesn't say th.*served upon y o u r
* " « a n affidavit
*° S «°» Cause is 8erved _
" ^ « « - ti 0 e the Order
has

MR- STODDARD
iJ
condJ v
-rst, I think -5 +
dly
lt
" - «ot oniy the o a s e
»*kes sense.
Crowder vs m *
quoted before v, ^
Dist
bUt also
•
rict Court of S a l t r
Se

—
conducted in t h ee pre
" ^ " ~ «^
of
»oh cire„„ 4.
senoe of n,
iroumstances the Court be,
° f t h e c°urt. 0 n
— M i c t i o n to bear d et
"**
" ^
for
oontempt i n «, ' ^ ^ ^
°' Punish petitl
Pt in the absence of . .
^"ioners
*" «"iary i n f o r m a t i Q n w
s

*-

affidavit. "
I think there has to be something telling you
what he is charged with, other than, "You're in contempt
of court."

It is always helpful for him, "You are in

contempt of court for some reason." We are supposed to
come into court and be prepared to defend against it.
THE COURT: All right, I will tell you what I
am willing to do here today.
submitted today.

Affidavits have been

I think in fairness to Mr. Bullock, he

is entitled to at least review those and come prepared to
defend against them, if he chooses to do so.

I am

willing to continue this case for one day to give you an
opportunity to do that.

THE COURT:

9:10 tomorrow, can you both make

that?
8

MR. HASLAM:

Your Honor, I have some

depositions scheduled but I will have them delayed.
THE COURT:

Another thing we could do is start

at 1:00, either time would be agreeable.
MR. STODDARD:
MR. HASLAM:

Either time is fine with me.
1:00 would be better for me, Your

Honor.
THE COURT: We will reconvene at 1:00 tomorrow
afternoon.

THE COURT: Very well.

Court is in recess

until 1:00 tomorrow.
MR. STODDARD:

Could we have a copy of the

original affidavit which we still don't have it?
MR. HASLAM:

I would be happy to give Mr.
9

Stoddard a copy.

I believe a copy was attached to the

Order to Show.
THE COURT:

The original Order to Show doesn't

have an affidavit with it.

10
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1

TUESDAY, JULY 7, 1992

2
3

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Let's go back on the record in the

4

matter of Toyota of Ogden vs. John R. Bullock.

The Court

5

notes the presence of counsel for both parties, as well

6

as Mr. Bullock.

Mr. Haslam, you may proceed.

7

MR. STODDARD:

Your Honor, just for the record,

8

I would like to renew my motion.

9

jurisdiction.

The Court lacks

For lack of jurisdiction.

Just for the

10

record, I would note that the Court indicated last night

11

at the close of the hearing that no affidavit was in the

12

file, which means that no affidavit was there when the

13

order was issued, which would mean an order was issued

14

without jurisdiction.

15

simply put myself on record.

16
17

MR. HASLAM:

That is formality.

I wanted to

May I address that question

immediately, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Yes.

19

MR. HASLAM:

I would like to present to the

20

Court a Notice of Continuance that I delivered to Mr.

21

Stoddard last night that essentially contains all of the

22

pleadings and all of the documents in the Court's file.

23

I would also like to present to the Court a copy of

24

Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

25

highlighted subsection (d), Your Honor.

I have

I wish to

1

correct myself in indicating to the Court that I was not

2

aware of a rule requiring service of an affidavit with an

3

Order to Show Cause.

4

certain Orders to Show Cause be accompanied by an

5

affidavit.

6

Rule 6 clearly requires that

I would also like to present to the Court an

7

original Constable's Amended Return of Service which

8

indicates that the defendant was served with an Order to

9

Show Cause and Motion and Affidavit and Memorandum.

10

I would also like to present to the Court a

11

copy of a case entitled Jenson vs. Eames in which the

12

Utah Supreme Court indicates that in a contempt

13

proceeding —

14

proceedings referencing service of an Order to Show Cause

15

that the five-day provision that appears in Rule 6 is not

16

a hard and fast rule and the Court has some discretion to

17 J

depart from the provisions of Rule 6-d.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

or excuse me, in an Order to Show Cause

THE COURT:

All right.

Why is there an Amended

Constable's Return?
MR. HASLAM:

Because the issue was raised

yesterday, Your Honor, about whether or not he had
received a copy of the affidavit with the Order to Show
Cause and I went back to the Constable's office yesterday
to verify what had been served.

I would also point out

to the Court that Mr. Stoddard indicated to me yesterday
before we began that his client learned that I had tapes
of the alleged conversations.

There is only one way that

he could have learned that there were any tapes of the
alleged conversations because they are referenced in the
affidavit that we submitted in support of the Order to
Show Cause.

The other reference to tapes, Your Honor,

was not presented to the Court until we got here
yesterday when I furnished copies of those affidavits to
him that referenced other tape recordings.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. STODDARD:

Thank you, Mr. Haslam.

Judge, briefly.

First, we
3

learned of the tapes because they have a tape recorder
here.

It is a fairly safe deduction:

you don't bring a

tape recorder to the court without tapes. That is the
basis for that statement by Mr. Bullock.

He came out and

said, "They must have tapes because they have a tape
machine here."

That is all.

The basis for my motion is it is very clear
from the Court's own statement, and I have not actually
seen the file, that there is no affidavit in the file.
The case I cited before, Robinson vs. City Court and —
THE COURT: There is an affidavit of Tony
Divino filed June 26, 1992.

Is that the affidavit which

you are referring?
MR. HASLAM:

Yes, Your Honor.

MR. STODDARD:

You indicated last night you

could not find one.
THE COURT:

I had not looked in the file. I

didn't say it wasn't in here.

I dust hadn't looked in

the file.
MR. STODDARD:

The strongest basis for the

motion was that the affidavit was not in the file. I
would renew the motion I made yesterday.

You have

already decided against me, but I am simply at this point
doing it as a formality in this hearing.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Stoddard
4

and Mr. Haslam.

I am satisfied that the Court has

jurisdiction in this case based upon the Amended
Constable's Return, also the case law that has been
submitted.

As to the time at which this matter may be

heard, I think that this matter could be heard within a
short time period or otherwise ordinarily prescribed by
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

MR. HASLAM:

Your Honor, I would like to

present to the Court a copy of a case entitled "Coleman
vs. Coleman," decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1983
and an opinion written by —

a per curiam opinion in

which the court outlines the basis upon which a finding
of contempt and imposition of jail sanctions can be
handled by the court.
In this case, Your Honor, the court holds that
5

once an affidavit is presented to the court and an Order
to Show Cause is issued by the court, then the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant.

So it is his obligation

to go forward at this time. The standard for the court,
as indicated in the Coleman case, is that a finding of
contempt and imposition of jail sentence must be
supported by clear and convincing proof that, one, the
defendant knew what was required by the previous court
order.

Two, that he had the ability to comply with the

court order,

and three, that he willfully and knowingly

failed and refused to do so.
Based upon the entire court file, and all of
the evidence presented and before the court at the time
the Order to Show Cause was issued, I believe that we
have carried our preliminary burden of establishing that
the defendant has violated this court's order and should
be found in contempt.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Haslam. Mr.
Stoddard.
MR. STODDARD:

I still think it is their burden

to go forward with testimony, but certain affidavits, Mr.
Divino's affidavit, I think is valid since he is in court
to support it. The other three affidavits I would move
to strike.

They basically don't say very much except

that he telephoned.

He made threats without identifying
6

1

what the threats were, what he said, any details.

2

would accept Mr. Divino's affidavit provided he also

3

testifies. But I don't think this court can simply go

4

forward on the basis of affidavits and shift the burden

5

to the defendant.

6

THE COURT: All right.

But I

By way of a procedural

7

approach here, in every contempt hearing which I have

8

been involved, although I think Mr. Haslam has stated the

9

law correctly, nevertheless the party seeking the

10

contempt order goes forward with testimony and presents

11

the testimony.

12

Haslam, if you wish to call your witness, you may do so.

So I would at this time advise you, Mr.

13

MR. HASLAM:

14

THE COURT: And I will reserve with regard to

15
16

I will do so, Your Honor.

the affidavits,
MR. STODDARD:

One preliminary matter, as I

17

understand, the tapes will be introduced.

I think some

18

formalities are involved.

19

certainly ask the Court to either be liberal with both

20

parties or strict with both parties on the foundation

21

departments.

If we want tapes in, I would

22

THE COURT:

Let's deal with that as it arises.

23 I

MR. HASLAM:

Call Mr. Tony Divino, Your Honor.

24
25

TONY DIVINQ
Called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, after
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HASLAM:
Q

Please state your full name and address, sir.

A

Tony Divino, 8490 South Sun Valley Drive;

Sandy, Utah.
Q

What is your occupation, sir?

A

I am the owner of Toyota of Ogden car

dealership.

It is actually on Riverdale Road in

Riverdale, Utah.
Q

And what is the business of Toyota of Ogden?

A

Retailing new and used automobiles and parts

and service.
Q

Do you have an employee there by the name of

Sue Bullock?
A

Yes, we do.

Q

Do you know what her responsibilities are?

A

She is a sales person for the new and used car

sales department.
Q

Do you know who her husband is?

A

John Bullock is, was, I am not sure where they

are at right now.
8

MR. HASLAM:

Your Honor, I have in the

courtroom what I would present to the Court as tape
recordings of the messages that were left on Mr. Divino's
answering machine.

The evidence is in in the form of Mr.

Divino's affidavit, but I think it would be helpful to
the Court to listen to the telephone messages.

If I may

proceed.
THE COURT:
Q

You may proceed.

(By Mr. Haslam) Mr. Divino, can you describe

for the Court what kind of message service you have on
your mobile phone.
A

It is voice mail.

If I am not available, if

the phone is shut off, or if I happen to be on the phone,
either way it will record a message from anyone that
wishes to leave one.
Q

And what does the caller do to get to your

voice mail?
A

They just call my regular number and it

basically says, "If you stay on the line, you can leave a
16

1

message."

2

Q

And were messages left?

3

A

Yes, several.

4
5
6
7

I had 12 the night in question

from Mr. Bullock.
Q

Is there a method to retrieve the voice mail

messages?
A

Yes.

I have to dial again the same phone

8

number and then I have to put in a code that only I know

9

and that gets me to my messages. And then it just asks

10
11
12

you if you want to listen to them or not, which I did.
MR. HASLAM:

Your Honor, I would like at this

time to turn on the tape.

13

THE COURT: Very well.

14

(Tape was played for the Court.)

15

MR. HASLAM:

Your Honor, I don't have any

16

further evidence to present at this time except in

17

connection with my client's claim for award of attorney's

18

fees for the cost of being involved in this mess.

19

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Haslam. Mr.

20
21

Stoddard, do you wish to cross?
MR. STODDARD:

22
23

I have a few questions.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. STODDARD:

24
25
17

Q

Can you point specifically to a threat to your

person?
A

"This is war.

going to pay."

Your fucking little balls are

Now, I think that is a threat to me

physically.
Q

Did he call you before concerning legal cases,

and said, MThis is war," had he not?
A

Once before in March.

Q

Concerning legal case?

A

No, just called me.

Q

He said, "This is warM?

A

M

Q

And you were involved in a legal dispute with

A

I am not involved in any dispute with him.

This is war."

him?
I

have a Restraining Order against him.
Q

Toyota of Ogden does.

A

They have a Restraining Order against him.

Q

So you are involved with a legal dispute?

A

If that is what you wish to call it, yes.

Q

Now, you referred to —

you out.

I tried to straighten

Did he give you warnings about what he felt

some of your employees were doing?
A

Yes, he —
MR. HASLAM:

question.

Your Honor, I will object to that

I don't think it is relevant to this

proceeding.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. STODDARD:

I think it is because I think it

explains some of the background of what has happened
here.
THE COURT: Ask your next question, counselor.
Q

(By Mr. Stoddard) When did you listen to these

tapes, at night or the next day?
19

THE COURT:

You may step down. You wish to

make a proffer as to your attorney's fees at this time?
MR. HASLAM:
present to the Court.

Your Honor, I have an affidavit to
I am delivering one to Mr.

Stoddard and the original to the Court.

I believe that

it complies with Rule 4-405 of the Code of Judicial
Administration, Your Honor.

I would be willing to take

the stand if there are any questions regarding my bill.
THE COURT: Mr. Stoddard, would you prefer that
20

1

Mr. Haslam take the stand?

2

MR. STODDARD:

No, I will challenge him at the

3

proper time, but I don't think he is entitled to

4

attorney's fees under the laws.

5

THE COURT: Well, this is a proffer as to what

6

the attorney's fees would be if the Court finds they

7

should be awarded in this case.

8
9

MR. STODDARD:
it.

I may —

I haven't had a chance to review it.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. STODDARD:

12

THE COURT:

You reserve on that?
I will reserve on that.

All right, we will allow that to be

13

reopened if necessary.

14 I

witnesses, Mr. Stoddard?

15

MR. STODDARD:

16

THE COURT:

17

I would like to look at

All right, do you have any

I will call Mr. Bullock.

All right, Mr. Bullock, step

forward.

18

JOHN ROBERT BUT.T.OCK

19

Called as a witness on his own behalf, after having been

20

first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

21

DIRECT EXAMINATION

22

BY MR. STODDARD:

23
24
25
21

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14 I
15

Q

Now, but you were aware you were not supposed

to call the dealer Toyota?

16

A

Yes, I was.

17

Q

At least the other people other than your wife?

18

A

Yes, I was.

19

Q

Now, going back to Saturday the 27th, did you

20
21
22

call your wife at Toyota?
A

I made my first attempt to reach my wife at

5:00.

23

Q

And why did you attempt to call her?

24

A

She had called and left a message the day

25 |

before telling me that she would return the call. Susan
22

and I had talked off and on quite often at her job and
she did not return the call.

There was a pressing matter

with regard to getting our divorce complete.

There was

also the matter that there had been attempted on Thursday
a delivery of the Order to Show Cause.

I confirmed on

Friday that that Order had been attempted to be
delivered.

I was not certain it was Toyota of Ogden

doing this until I called Winder and Haslam and made
confirmation they were attempting to deliver this Order
and I gave them the proper address.
Q

When did you do that?

A

I did that on Friday.

Q

Now —

A

Excuse me, that was done on Monday.

Monday.
Q

The

The proper address was done on Monday.
Now on Saturday, did you try to call your wife

again?
A

Yes. There were probably two or three

occasions between 5 and 7:30 where I attempted to reach
her and was told she was at the dental.
Q

Did you keep calling?

A

After the third occasion at about 7:30, someone

had answered with the —

I was not certain of the name.

Now I have seen some of the affidavits.
what it was.

It is three names.

I believe I know

It is something23

something-something the third.
that —

At that time he told me

I guess my voice had been identified.

realized I was trying to reach Susan.

They

He told me he was

going to have me suck his cock.
MR. HASLAM:

Object, Your Honor, this doesn't

have anything to do with whether or not he violated the
Restraining Order.
MR. STODDARD:

I think it does.

I think the

Court is going to have to hear this. We are essentially
going to admit that they violated the Restraining Order,
but we would urge the Court there are mitigating
circumstances.
THE COURT:

I really don't see that this is

particularly relevant to this contempt hearing, besides
of what this other person might have said to him, I
believe is hearsay.

So, I will sustain the objection.

MR. STODDARD:

We are not going to the truth of

the matter, simply that these things were said.
THE COURT:

He can testify to what he did in

response to what he was informed of, but it is hearsay as
to what this other person said to him, I believe.
am sustaining the objection.
MR. STODDARD:

So I

Ask your next question.

Well, are you ruling we should

not at this point go into mitigating circumstances or
would that be a separate hearing?
24

THE COURT:

1
2

I sustained the objection to that

question.
MR. STODDARD:' I understand that, Your Honor.

3
4

What I am intending to pursue here is not so much that he

5

did not do it, but the mitigating circumstances that are

6

involved.
THE COURT: What is relevant here is whether he

7
8

knew the Order, whether he knew what was required by the

9

previous Court Order, whether he had the ability to

10

comply with it, and whether he failed and refused to

11

comply with it. Those are the issues that are relevant

12

to this proceeding.

13
14

Q

So ask your questions accordingly.

(By Mr. Stoddard) Now did the person say

something that upset you?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

How much did it upset you?

17

A

I had been between 5:00 and 7:30, I had been

18

drinking substantially.

19

kind, if you will.

20

messages I left for Mr. Tony Divino.

When that happens, I respond in

I think that is reflected by the

21
22
23
24
25
25

Q

(By Mr. Stoddard) Now, in the past when you

called up there, had you been goated by people up there?
A

I have been on calling them not only goated by

people up there, but I have received phone calls at my
home —
MR. HASLAM:

Your Honor, he is in violation and
26

I object to testimony along this line.
THE COURT:

I will permit this answer.

Go

ahead.
THE WITNESS:

I have when calling up there, and

being recognized by individuals, been goated, as you say,
been insulted, been told my wife is doing things.

I have

also had phone calls at my home shortly after those
incidents which gave me cause to believe that there is an
attempt to cause me to react.
Q

(By Mr. Stoddard) Has your life ever been

threatened?
A

Yes, it has.

Q

In what terms?
MR. HASLAM:

Your Honor, I will object to the

line of questioning.
THE COURT: All right, I am going to sustain
that objection.
proceeding.

I don't think this is relevant to this

Mr. Stoddard, the question is whether he

willfully and knowingly failed and refused to comply with
the Court Order, and mitigation I don't see is a
particular issue. And I am not going to debate the point
with you.

I have sustained the objection.
MR. STODDARD:

point.

I would like to make one further

I think it is important in this type of hearing

as to whether the plaintiffs themselves have clean hands.
27

1

A

It is quite obvious.

I was aware of the

2

Court's Order.

I did not want to violate the Court's

3

Order.

4

sucking someone's cock, when I am drinking I am going to

5

respond.

But when told that my wife is in the back room

6

Q

And why did you call Mr. Divino?

7

A

Because he is the chief executive officer,

8

because my first initial attempt to explain what was

9

going on there, described in my January 30th letter, put

10

the burden on him to straighten up the mess that is up

11

there.

12

MR. HASLAM:

Move to strike the answer as being

13

non-responsive.

14

doesn't matter here, Your Honor.

15

irrelevant.

16

He is testifying about stuff that

THE COURT:

This is totally

I am going to let the answer stand.

17

However, I am not interested in generalizations here, Mr.

18 I

Stoddard.

I am interested in what happened on June 27th

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
29

Q

Now there is talk in the affidavits about a

summons, a threat that you received.

I believe it is the

first time you called or mentioned a summons.

In the

first phone call you made, I understand you are
unintelligible about a summons.
A

Correct.

Q

Were you aware that someone was trying to serve

you with a summons?
A

Yes, there had been an attempt to serve me at

my brother"s residence at 52 West 7200 South, and through
my family I learned that someone was attempting to serve
me.

I had to —

I assumed it was Toyota of Ogden because

this is the only trouble I have.
Q

And as you have already testified, you called

to make arrangements to be served with that summons on
Monday?
A

Yes.

Q

Instead of hiding out.

A

(No audible response.)

Q

Was that one of the reasons you were calling
31

1

your wife?

2

A

Yes, I was trying to confirm, one, did she know

3

anything about the summons, the Order to Show Cause it

4

should be called, I guess, being served and I also had a

5

recording from her indicating that she had something that

6

she wanted to speak to me about.

7

MR. STODDARD:

8

questions at this point.

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. HASLAM:

11
12 I

Anyway, I have no further

All right.

Any cross?

Briefly, Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. HASLAM:

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
32

Q

And does the Order in the Court's file indicate

that a copy of the Court's Order was mailed to you at 50
West 7200 South?
A

I discovered that this morning.

Q

You are telling the Court today that you didn't

get it?
A

I never received it.

Q

Can you tell the Court what the premises are at

50 West 7200 South?
A

They are apartments, a boxing gym and my

parents' home.
Q

A boxing gym?

A

Yes.

Q

What goes on in a boxing gym.
33

A

We are coaches of amateur fighting.
MR. STODDARD:

irrelevant.

What goes on in a boxing gym is

He is simply stating the truth.

He did not

actually receive the Order.
MR. HASLAM:

I think it is very relevant to the

question of what this Court is going to do with this man
to prevent him from doing it again.
MR. STODDARD:
the Order.

He has admitted he knew about

He didn't receive a copy of it.

THE COURT:

I really don't see the significance

of a boxing gym at this particular address.
MR. HASLAM:
THE COURT:

I have no further questions.
Any redirect?

MR. STODDARD:
THE COURT:

I have no further questions.

You have any other witnesses, Mr.

Stoddard?
MR. STODDARD: No.
THE COURT:
MR. HASLAM:

Any rebuttal?
I have no rebuttal, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

Counsel, you may argue

it.
MR. HASLAM:

Your Honor, the contempt was filed

February 6, 1992, a TRO was issued the same day to
prevent him from contacting the people at Toyota of
Ogden.

The scope of the Order includes employees on the
34

premises and employees off the premises. Mr. Divino
clearly falls within the scope.
The first affidavit we filed with the court on
behalf of Mr. Divino on June 26th contains two messages.
He continued to receive messages after that time, ten
calls on June 27th.

It is un-rebutted before this court

that Mr. Divino testified that his dealership had
received hundreds of telephone calls from Mr. Bullock.
We have before the Court affidavits and Mr. Divino's
testimony with 29 clear, un-rebutted violations of the
Court's Order.
Under Utah Code Annotated, section 78-31-1, I
believe the Court has to find him in contempt of this
Court's Order.

Under section 10 of Chapter 32, the Court

can fine him $200 per violation.

The Court can order him

to jail up to 30 days per violation.

Under section 78-

32-11, the Court is entitled to make an award of costs
and expenses or losses that a party may suffer as a
result of the violation of the Court's Order.
The law in the State of Utah, as I understand
it, Your Honor, with respect to criminal violations is
that intoxication is not a defense to a criminal case.
This is a civil contempt matter and the plaintiff, for
our burden of proof, if that is what it is, does not
require evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and it is
35

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 I

MR. STODDARD:

Your Honor, first let me read

19

some of the details. He alleges, I think, 29 separate

20

violations.

21

THE COURT:

I am going to look at just the ten.

22 I

MR. STODDARD:

23
24
25
36

I think the defendant has been subjected to
harassment.

He did himself record two messages that took

place after this, but I think they indicate what the kind
of abuse he has been subjected to and I will ask at this
point the Court want to hear testimony in mitigation of
what has happened and what he has been subjected to? I
think it is relevant at this point. This is essentially
the sentence.

I think it would be relevant to hear some

testimony as to what he has been subjected to and the
mitigating circumstances of what he did.
37

THE COURT:

I have ruled on that issue.

MR. STODDARD:

Okay, I can understand that is

part of the trial itself, but I think there should be
some mitigation too so the Court will understand why he
did what he did.

Again, the sentencing is for leeway, if

there is one. And we are not contesting the actual
contempt. We feel that he did violate the Court Order.
He is admitting that. But we feel the Court should
listen to some mitigating circumstances as to why he did
it.

It wasn't just unprovoked incidents out of the blue

calls to Divino.
THE COURT:

In all due respect, Mr. Stoddard, I

don't think mitigating circumstances are relevant to this
kind of proceeding.

There is a Court Order in place and

the only issues are whether he knew of the Court Order,
whether he had the ability to comply with it, whether he
reasonably and knowingly failed to or refused to comply
with it. And those are the relevant issues and I don't
think mitigation is relevant.

I have already ruled on

that.
MR. STODDARD:

But I do think the Court has a

choice of how he found out about it. The Court,
hopefully, may feel that he is less —

may treat him less

harshly if he was goated than if he were to do it clear
out of the blue.

I think it is relevant.
38

THE COURT:

Well, if he hadn 't called in the

first place, there wouldn't have been any allegation of
being goated.
MR. STODDARD:

That may be true. But I just

think what he was doing here, with all of his trouble, I
just knew he called his wife to try to settle a domestic
dispute.
THE COURT:

Now, he knew he wasn't supposed to

do that, Mr. Stoddard.
MR. STODDARD:

In the first place, he was

returning her phone calls.
THE COURT:

It doesn't matter, Mr. Stoddard,

under the Court Order.
MR. STODDARD:

As to attorney's fees, I do have a lack of
preparation time.

I can cite in the annotations to 78-

32-10, under attorney's fees it says, "There is no
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provisions for additional penalty of attorney's fees for
a contempt."

Miller vs. Coke, 597 Pac2d 882.

have time to read that case.

I did not

I would like, before the

Court decides on the attorney's fees, I would like an
opportunity to read that.
THE COURT:

Do you have any objections to the

reasonableness of the attorney's fees presented in the
affidavit?
MR. STODDARD:
to go over it.

I have not really had a chance

I will reserve that.

I think that would

also depend somewhat on how the Court rules or whether he
is entitled to attorney's fees at all.

I know on that

one case, at least the way it sounds, would suggest he is
not entitled to any attorney's fees whatsoever.
The statute does say he is entitled to cost.
So if there are costs involved, I think there would be
actual out-of-pocket cost, I think he would be entitled
to those under the statute.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr.
Stoddard.

Anything else, Mr. Haslam?
MR. HASLAM:

Your Honor, again, I believe that

the case I presented to the Court of Coleman vs. Coleman
is what should guide the Court today.
he knew the Court Order existed.
aware of its terms.

It is clear that

It is clear that he was

It is clear that he had the ability
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to comply by simply not picking up the telephone, and it
is clear that he did this knowingly.

He admitted on the

witness stand, and he admitted pn the tape recordings
that he knew he was violating the Court Order.
In connection with the question of attorney's
fees, Your Honor, section 11 specifically provides, "If
an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or
special proceedings prejudicial to his rights therein is
caused by the contempt, the Court in addition to the fine
or imprisonment imposed for the contempt in place
thereof, may order the person proceeded against pay the
aggrieved party a sum of money sufficient to indemnify
him and to satisfy his costs and his expenses, which
order and the acceptance of money under this is a bar to
an action by the aggrieved party for such loss and
injury.M
Your Honor, we have not filed a claim for any
kind of intentional tort which is available to us. Mr.
Divino and Toyota of Ogden simply want this to stop today
and be indemnified for the losses they have suffered.
That is all I have.
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Based upon
the testimony that has been presented to the Court and
the Court having considered the argument of counsel, I
hereby enter the following finding with regard to the
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